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Abstract
The 787 program is the latest airplane development program in Boeing
Commercial Airplanes. In this program, many new business processes, including a new
supply chain structure will be implemented.
Based on my six-month internship in Boeing, this thesis will address two critical
supply chain issues that the 787 program currently faces and offer recommendations.
The two issues are as follows:
* Boeing currently plays a very active role in managing the ordering and scheduling
protocols for drop-shipped components. Drop-shipped components are parts that are
ordered by Boeing but to be delivered to another supplier or subcontractors for
installation and assembly. Current processes will not be adequate to handle the large
amount of drop-shipped components in the 787 program. It is recommended that
Boeing sets up a supplier portal to manage the interactions with and between partners.
* Current non-compliance management processes for drop-shipped components are not
efficient enough for the 787 program. To solve this problem, it is recommended that
Boeing devotes dedicated resources to work with individual structural partners on
their sites to facilitate managing the non-conformance processes.
Thesis Supervisor: David Simchi-Levi
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Co-Director of Leaders for Manufacturing Program
Thesis Supervisor: Jeremie Gallien
Title: J. Spencer Standish Career Development Professor of Sloan School of
Management
This page is intentionallyleft blank
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my thesis supervisors, Professor Jeremie Gallien and Professor
David Simchi-Levi, for their tremendous support in my research and the writing of this
thesis. My gratitude also goes to Professor Charlie Fine, Professor Jonathon Byrnes, and
Professor Chris Caplice who have taken the time to share with me their insights and
experience.
I would also want to thank Professor Ezra Zuckerman, Professor Rebecca Henderson and
Professor Charlie Fine for teaching me various innovative strategic frameworks in their
strategy classes, which I have used extensively in the writing of this thesis.
I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to all the LFM alumni and everyone I have
met in the Boeing Company for their insights, support and friendship. In particular, I
would like to thank Scott Strode for his support of this internship, and Gary Blattenbauer
for his guidance on my day-to-day activities. Kathryn Whiting, Thomas Haley, Quang
Nguyen and Lucia Chung also played indispensable roles in my research, and deserve my
greatest gratitude.
I also like to thank Professor Don Rosenfield for creating the Leaders for Manufacturing
(LFM) program, and giving me this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity of great education and
personal transformation.
I am grateful for the friendship, encouragement, and support from all my friends and
teammates in my LFM and MBA Class ('04, '05 and '06), who made my Sloan
experience in the past 2 years enjoyable and memorable.
I also feel blessed by the friendship of all my brothers and sisters in Christ from HKSBS
and BCEC. I especially thank them for being there for my husband, Henry, while I was
away in Seattle for the internship.
I must also thank all my family members in Seattle, who loved me and shared their lives
with me during my time there, especially Grandma, who graciously let me borrow her car
to commute to work every day.
This acknowledgment would not be complete without mentioning my dear husband,
Henry, who, for so many years, has been my soul mate and the love of my life, and has
been by my side through much joy and many tears. I simply cannot imagine going
through these two years without him.
Last but not least, I thank God for all the blessings in my life. Without Him, I would not
be the person I am today and I would not have the gifts and courage to strive to become
more like Him everyday.
5
This page is intentionally left blank
6
Table of Contents
Acknow ledgem ents ..................................................................................................... 5
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................... 7
List of Figures ................................................................................................................. 8
Thesis Overview ........................................................................................................ 9
I. Industry Analysis ....................................................................................................... 11
A. M ajor Players in the Industry ................................................................................ 11
" The Boeing Company .................................................................................... 11
" Airbus Industries........................................................................................ 12
" Em braer ..................................................................................................... 13
B. Industry Characteristics...................................................................................... 15
" Product & M arket ........................................................................................ 15
" Cost Structure ............................................................................................ 16
" Technology................................................................................................. 16
* Post-September 11 Civil Aviation............................................................... 16
C. Industry Dynam ics............................................................................................ 18
" Innovation and Technology........................................................................ 18
" Strategic Analysis - Porter's Five Forces ................................................... 21
" Positioning for the Future........................................................................... 23
II. Supply Chain Analysis.......................................................................................... 28
A . Literature Review ............................................................................................ 28
B. Supply Chain Dynamics................................................................................... 29
* V alue Chain Overview ............................................................................... 29
* M ake vs. Buy............................................................................................. 30
" Integration vs. Disintegration...................................................................... 32
" Airbus' M odularized Supply Chain............................................................. 33
" Alignment of Product and Supply Chain Architecture ................................. 34
III. Case Study: 787 Supply Chain D evelopm ent ........................................................ 37
A . Introduction..................................................................................................... 37
" The N ew Airplane - 787 ............................................................................ 37
" The Challenge of the New Partnership Structure.........................................38
" The Supply Chain Challenge...................................................................... 40
* Key Research Questions............................................................................. 42
B. Ordering and Scheduling................................................................................... 44
* The Challenge............................................................................................ 44
" Competitive Benchm arking ........................................................................ 46
" The Recom m endation ................................................................................. 46
" The Implem entation ................................................................................... 49
C. Quality and Compliance................................................................................... 50
" The Challenge............................................................................................ 50
" Competitive Benchm arking ........................................................................ 52
" The Recom m endation ................................................................................. 53
7
0 The Im plem entation .................................................................................... 55
D . Final Thoughts................................................................................................. 56
IV . Concluding R em arks .......................................................................................... 58
R eferences.....................................................................................................................59
List of Figures
Figure 1 Key Events in the Duopoly ........................................................................... 19
Figure 2 Technological Innovations in the Modem Commercial Jet Age ................... 20
Figure 3 Industry Structure in Porter's Five Forces Framework .................................. 21
Figure 4 What is the Middle of the Market (MOM)?................................................ 24
Figure 5 Overview of the Airbus family ................................................................... 25
Figure 6 Value Chain for Civil Aviation....................................................................29
Figure 7 Boeing's Dependency Dynamics Capability Outsourcing and Technological
D ependency ....................................................................................................... . 3 1
Figure 8 The Double Helix - Illustrating How Industry/Product Structure Evolve from
Vertical/Integral to Horizontal/Modular, and Back.............................................33
Figure 9 Airbus' Modularized Supply Chain ............................................................ 34
Figure 10 Interactions between Product and Supply Chain Architectures...................36
Figure 11 Key Milestones in the 787 Program...........................................................37
Figure 12 Anticipated Differences between 787 and sustaining programs..................38
Figure 13 Supply Chain for the Sustaining Programs.................................................40
Figure 14 787 Supply Chain Design ........................................................................... 40
Figure 15 Stuffed Section of a Ship .......................................................................... 41
Figure 16 Drop-Shipped Components Management Process......................................44
Figure 17 How a Supplier Portal Facilitate Communication between Boeing, Structural
Partners and Component Suppliers ................................................................... 47
Figure 18 Roles and Responsibilities in Ordering and Scheduling..............................48
Figure 19 Quality Compliance Management Process ................................................. 51
Figure 20 Applying Best Practice from Automotive Industry to Current Quality
Compliance Management Process......................................................................54
8
Thesis Overview
This thesis is written based on my six-month internship at the Boeing Company in
Everett, Washington, from June to December 2004. My internship project is sponsored
by the vice president of manufacturing and quality in the 787 program, Mr. Scott Strode
and supervised by Professor Jeremie Gallien from the Operations Management group in
MIT Sloan School of Management, and by Professor David Simchi-Levi from the
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering in the School of Engineering at
MIT.
This thesis is organized as follows. Section I sets the stage by providing an
overview of the major players, industry dynamics and recent developments in the
commercial aircraft manufacturing industry. Section II dives deep into an analysis of the
current supply chain architecture of the Boeing Company and the latest industry
dynamics. In Section III, a detailed case study involving the unique supply chain
challenges faced by the 787 program is presented, including the specific supply chain and
operations issues that I investigated and addressed during my stay at Boeing.
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I. Industry Analysis
The commercial aerospace industry generates 28 million jobs worldwide and
USD 1.4 trillion in annual gross output.' It is the biggest contributor to the US
manufacturing trade balance, amounting to USD 26 billion dollars in net exports in
2002.2 Today, the industry can be best characterized by a duopoly between the Boeing
Company and Airbus Industries. Historically, Boeing has dominated the industry since
the beginning of the jet age, thanks to a series of very successful models. It was not until
the 1990s when the industry underwent a transformation from primarily a monopoly by
Boeing, to a competitive duopoly. In 2004, Airbus attained the no.1 market position and
delivered 35 more aircrafts than Boeing, accounting for 53% of total deliveries that year.
A. Major Players in the Industry
The Boeing Company
The Boeing Company is the largest aviation, aerospace and defense company in
the world. Based in Chicago, Illinois, Boeing is consisted of two main businesses; its
defense division, Integrated Defense Systems (IDS, headquartered in St. Louis,
Missouri), and its commercial division, Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA,
headquarters in Seattle, Washington), the latter of which will be the main focus of this
thesis. Key manufacturing sites for commercial airplanes are located in Everett,
'"Crucial Committed Competitive", Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2003, pg.7.
2 "Crucial Committed Competitive", Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2003, pg. 13.
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Washington (777, 767 and 747), Renton, Washington (737, 757) and Long Beach,
California (717).
In 2004, the total company revenue (Defense and Commercial) is USD 52.5
billion with an operating income of USD 2.0 billion and an operating margin of 3.8%. In
2003, the total revenue for Boeing Commercial Airplanes is USD 22.4 billion.3 In the
fourth quarter of 2004 alone, the revenue for Boeing Commercial Airplanes is USD 5.4
billion. Boeing Commercial Airplanes delivered 285 airplanes, and won 126 orders and
commitment from eight airlines for the new 787 in 2004.4 In 2002, Boeing Commercial
Airplanes purchased almost USD 10 billion worth of goods and services from an
estimated 5,580 companies across the US and USD 13.5 billion in goods and services
from approximately 9,400 companies worldwide.5
Traditionally, Boeing has dominated the commercial airliner market, as reflected
by the fact that 76% of the jets in the air today are Boeing planes.6 Its short-to-medium
range 737 has been the best-selling jetliner of all time. Its jumbo jet 747 has also
dominated the twin-aisle, long range market since her introduction in 1968. In 1989,
Boeing added the twin-engine, highly efficient and innovative 777 to its airplane family
and the 777 quickly became one of the best selling airplanes in the medium-to-long range
market.
Airbus Industries
Airbus Industries was established in 1970 as an airplane manufacturer. In 2001,
an European consortium of French, German, and later Spanish and U. K. companies,
3 "Annual Report", The Boeing Company, 2003.
4 "Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2004 Performance Review", The Boeing Company, February 2, 2005.
5 "Crucial Committed Competitive", Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2003, pg.56.
6 "Crucial Committed Competitive", Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2003, pg.2.
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called Aeronautic Defense and Space Company, was formed and became the majority
owner of Airbus. Its two key manufacturing facilities are located at Toulouse, France and
Hamburg, Germany, with subassembly locations all over Western Europe.
In 2004, Airbus delivered 320 aircrafts and attained the No. 1 market position in
terms of deliveries for the second year in a row. Its total revenue is 20 billion euros in
2004. In 2001, Airbus has spent 14.1 billion euros in procurement all over the world,
purchasing from more than 1,500 contractors in more than 30 countries. 7
A series of successful new model launches by Airbus has enabled it to rise from
relative oblivion in the airliner business to become one of the key players in the industry
today. For instance, the introduction of the A320 family of aircraft in 1984 was a major
success for Airbus. The A320 family's optimized cabin cross-section - the widest single-
aisle fuselage on the market - sets new standards for passenger cabin flexibility in this
segment. Featuring the most modern fly-by-wire technology available on any single-aisle
aircraft, the A320 family provides operators with the highest degree of commonality and
economy for aircraft in the 100-220 seat category.8 More recently, in 2000, the new
"double- decker" A380 was launched, which promises to offer 10-15% lower operating
cost, 10-15% more range, lower fuel burn, less noise and lower emissions than its Boeing
jumbo counterpart 747-400.
* Embraer
Based in Sao Jose dos Campos, Brazil, Embraer was founded in 1969, as a
government initiative and was privatized in 1994. Currently, Brazilian interests
(investment conglomerate Bozano Group and pension funds PREVI and SISTEL) control
7 http://www.airbus.cor/procurement/facts n figures.asp
8 http://www.airbus.com/media/a320 family.asm
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60% of the voting shares and a leading group of European aerospace companies
(Dassault Aviation, EADS, Snecma and Thales) owns another 20%.9
In 2003, Embraer's net sales amounted to USD 2.1 billion, with a net income of
USD 136 million. In the first three quarters of 2004, its net sales increased to USD 2.49
billion with a net income of USD 297 million. Embraer delivered 101 jets in 2003 and
148 jets in the first three quarters of 2004. It currently employs 14,500 people, with 95%
of them based in Brazil. It was Brazil's largest exporter from 1999 to 2001 and the
second largest in 2002 - 2004.
Traditionally, Embraer's well established regional jets family, Legacy - Legacy
Executive, Legacy Shuttle and Legacy Shuttle HC, represents its core business in
corporate aviation. Recently, Embraer has moved to increase the size of the jets it
manufactures, expanding its customer base from mainly corporate and private customers
to commercial airlines. Embraer's emerging commercial jetliner business is focused on
the 70 to 110 seat market, based on what Embraer calls the "Rule of 70 to 110".'o The
observed trend is that mid-range aircraft (120 to 150 seats) with too many seats are flying
smaller demand routes, while expanding regional markets are pressing regional jets
(below 50 seats) to carry more passengers more frequently. Embraer has thus sought to
find its niche in the equipment gap in the 70 to 110 seat segment, a range for which an
efficient aircraft family did not exist. This approach has been highly successful, as
evident from the popular demand of its E170/190 family jets by low-cost domestic
airliners, such as Jet Blue."
9 http://www.embraer.com
10 http://www.ruleof7Otol 10.com/main/index.html
" "JetBlue Airways Orders 100 EMBRAER 190 Aircrafts, with options for an additional 100", June 10,
2003. http://www.jetblue.com/learnmore/pressDetail.asp?newsld=179.
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B. Industry Characteristics
It is very important to first understand the key characteristics of the industry
before we can clearly analyze the industry dynamics12. The following sections detail the
relevant industry characteristics.
* Product & Market
Aircraft orders are extremely cyclical. As illustrated in the popular beer game,
delays in the supply chain, especially when the lead time is as long as what is typical in
the aircraft manufacturing industry, can be very costly. The long lead time in current
production is a result of the complexity of manufacturing processes and highly
customizable parts, which in turn stem from a fairly heterogeneous demand. Airlines
have different needs for different routes and schedules. They also have varied preferences
for features, as well as for the degree of flexibility and capability for customization.
It is also important to note that whereas the brand is relatively less important for
commercial aircraft; purchase decisions by airlines are more often impacted by the
existing maintenance crew and flight crew, as any training costs incurred often represent
a significant percentage of the operating costs. Consequently, the cost of switching from
one airplane manufacturer to another can be prohibitively high, depending on the
customer's existing fleet composition.
12 Concepts taken from course 15.912 Technology Strategy by Rebecca Henderson, Spring 2005
13 The beer game is a logistics game developed at MIT. It is widely used in many business schools as a tool
to explain the key fundamentals in operations management. http://beergame.mit.edu/default.htm
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0 Cost Structure
The cost structure of commercial aircraft manufacturing can be characterized by
high fixed costs, and relatively marginal production costs. Labor costs are kept high by
the union contracts in both Boeing and Airbus. Production operates at a high minimum
efficient scale.'.
* Technology
Technological innovation has been the key driver for product differentiation,
although most of the innovations in recent years reside in systems and components that
are outside of the manufacturer's domain, such as in avionics and flight control systems.
Over the past few years, manufacturers have tried to differentiate themselves by
leveraging more significant technological advances, for instance, Boeing's composite
building materials for its new 787 model and Airbus' "double deck" design for its A380.
* Post-September 11 Civil Aviation
The impact of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 on the civil aviation
industry is highly detrimental. According to ICAO' preliminary estimates, the world's
scheduled airlines lost USD 11.9 billion in 2001, more than half of which - USD 7.4
billion - was shed by the 10 US major airlines. In comparison, the worldwide airline
industry earned an estimated USD 3.3 billion in 2000. Revenue fell 7.1% to USD 305.3
billion in 2001 while operating expenses dipped only 0.5% to USD 316.2 billion. World
14 Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) is the output for a business in the long run where the internal economies
of scale have been fully exploited. Aircraft manufacturing has a high minimum efficient scale since it
requires high fixed cost to start operation and it takes high production volume to fully exploit the full
economies of scale potential. http://www.tutor2u.net/economics/content/toics/buseconomics/mes.htn
15 ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization
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airline traffic (RPKs16 ) dropped 3% in 2001 - the first year-over-year decline since 1990-
9 1. 1
In addition to plummeting revenue, September 11 also brought additional concern
with the security of flying, which heightened airline security and increased insurance
costs. Airlines are estimated to spend up to $30,000 to transform each of their cockpit
doors into miniature bank vaults. The emergency counter-terrorism bill imposed a 30%
tax on domestic ticket prices.18 Overall industry insurance premium increased by USD 2
billion. Rising fuel and labor costs only worsened the problem.
The cash-strapped airlines in the post-September 11 era were compelled to revise
their vision and strategy on managing and acquiring their fleet. With huge up-front
investment and long payback periods, fleet acquisition is among one of the most
important strategic decisions airlines need to face. It affects their financial position, the
operation costs, and their ability to serve specific routes. For example, a wide-body long-
range 747-400 aircraft costs as much as USD 200 million, and a narrow-body 150-seat
plane costs about USD 35-50 million, and both will impact the balance sheet (straight
line depreciation) for at least 10 to 15 years. 19 After September 11, the "ideal" payback
period on a new aircraft shortened, since the airlines could no longer afford enormous
assets in early depreciation cycles tied up on their balance sheet. As a result, in addition
to traditional fleet acquisition, many airlines began to look into other options, which
include leasing, power-by-the-hour (pay for service), modification of existing aircrafts
16 RPK - Revenue Passenger Kilometers
17 "A Year Not Soon Forgotten", Air Transportation World, Jul 2002,
18 "Impact of September 11 on Air Transportation", lecture notes from course 16.71J The Airline Industry,
by John Hansman, MIT International Center for Air Transportation, Sept 11, 2002.
19 "Airline Planning Processes: Fleets and Routes", lecture notes from course 16.71J The Airline Industry,
by Peter Belobaba, Oct 2, 2002.
17
and conversion from freighters to passenger planes. On the other hand, the existing
excessive capacity also increases the price elasticity on new fleet purchases, which
resulted in bidding wars between aircraft manufacturers, driving prices down to marginal
cost.
Minimizing operating costs also becomes paramount. The success of low cost
carriers, as demonstrated by Ryan Air and EasyJet in Europe, and Southwest and Jet Blue
in the US, intensifies the pressure on ticket prices for traditional carriers, causing them to
turn to cost control in order to stay competitive. Apart from the increasing reluctance and
delay in fleet purchase and upgrade, traditional airlines also responds by reducing
onboard food services and amenities, increasing luggage restrictions, reducing schedules
and eliminating less profitable routes. In order to minimize operating costs, airlines also
seek to find the "exact fleet fit" for specific routes in order to maximize average load
factor per flight.2 0 .
C. Industry Dynamics
* Innovation and Technology
In the early years of aviation in the 1900s, many small aircraft companies were set
up. Among them, are the world's first aircraft company founded by Charles and Gabriel
Voisin to build custom planes outside Paris, France. The first US airplane company was
founded by Glenn Curtiss in Hammondsport, New York. The first scheduled air service
began in Florida in 1914, across Tampa Bay. Curtiss' design made the 18-mile trip
across Tampa Bay in 23 minutes, a considerable improvement over the two-hour trip by
20 "Load Factor" is the percentage of seats that is generating revenue on any given flight. Airliner's
profitability is highly sensitive to this metric.
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boat or the 12-hour trip by rail. The plane accommodated one passenger at a time, and the
company charged a one-way fare of $5.21 At that time, flying was a major technological
innovation, a disruptive technology that revolutionized transportation.
In mid-1927, Boeing started to produce the Model 40A passenger/mail plane. By
1954, the dominant design of the modem commercial jet was created - Boeing's 707.
Although intended as a military tanker, the 707 revolutionized commercial aviation,
cutting intercontinental travel time almost in half and bringing airfares within the
financial reach of more people. The 707 gave Boeing a competitive advantage it has
never lost. 22
Since then, Boeing has monopolized commercial aviation until the 1990's when
Airbus began to gain a foothold in the airplane market with its introduction of the A320
in 1984. The two companies have since been a long standing duopoly in commercial
aircraft manufacturing. Figure 123 shows the key developments in the duopoly since the
1950s.
1950s Boeing 707, introduced in 1958, launches the jet age. It was expensive, but its speed
(doubling that of piston-engine airliners) made it successful.
1960s Boeing introduced the 737 in 1967. It became the best-selling and longest-running airliner
in production. The jet has since undergone two extensive makeovers in order to maintain
its competitiveness.
1970s Boeing's iconic 747, introduced in 1970, was double the size of the next biggest airliners.
Upstart Airbus produced its first commercial jet, the A300 - the first twin-aisle, twin-jet
airliner, but was not popular enough to pose a threat to Boeing.
1980s In 1982, Boeing's 767 became the first long-range airliner to fly transoceanic flights with
just two engines. The Airbus launched the A320 in 1987, the first highly automated, fly-
by-wire aircraft.
1990s In 1993, Airbus introduced the A330 and A340, similar but larger versions of the A320. In
1995, Boeing delivered the 777, a versatile, fly-by-wire jet.
2000s Airbus launched the double-decker A380 in 2000. In 2002, Boeing terminated the Sonic
Cruiser project. Subsequently, Boeing launched the 787 program (formerly known as 7E7)
which will go into service in 2008.
Figure 1 Key Events in the Duopoly
21 http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/4294/history/
2 hBip://www.boeing.com.au/History/boeing.html
2"Boeing, Boeing, Gone?", Popular Science, Jun 2004.
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Since the emergence of the dominant design of the modem commercial jet, the
industry has experienced a series of incremental innovation, including improvements in
systems, structure, materials and interior designs. All these subsequent incremental
technological improvements are based on the current dominant design. Using the
innovation "S-curve" analysis2 4 , the current commercial jet age has reached maturity -
the top of the S-curve. Figure 2 shows the S-curve illustrating the relationship between
performance and time. There has yet to be another radical innovation comparable to that
of the modem jet design in 1954. Only when such a groundbreaking innovation arises
will the industry experience a disruption and jump on the next "S-curve."
Performance
Maturity
Takeoff Disruption
Ferm
Time
Figure 2 Technological Innovations in the Modern Commercial Jet Age
24 The "S-curve" is a tool used by many business strategists to understand and forecast trends in technology
driven businesses. The bottom of the S-curve is a period of ferment when many small firms test various
technologies. The steep slope represents the emergence of the dominant design and occurrence of the
industry shakeout. The top of the S-curve represents a period when the existing dominant design reaches
maturity. The industry will start on another S-curve if another dominant design emerges and overtake the
current one. Concept taken from course 15.912 Technology Strategy by Rebecca Henderson, Spring 2005.
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* Strategic Analysis - Porter's Five Forces
Using the Porter-Five Forces2 framework, we can further analyze the industry by
understanding the key forces behind the industry dynamics. As illustrated in figure 3, the
five key forces are buyer power, supplier power, barriers of entry, substitutes, and rivalry.
High barrier to entry
- High fixed cost and upfront
initial investment are required for
a new entrant.
High Buyer PowerModerate Supplier 
- Fierce competition
Power Intense Rivalry -Duopoly between the duopoly
- Some suppliers are -The rivalry is a long-standing provides room for airlines
more powerful (e.g. duopoly with some new prto leverage the aircraft
systems, scarce raw competitors moving in from the manufacturers over each
materials), and some corporate jets market. other to get the best deals.
are less so.
Low Substitute
- Currently, there is no other
efficient form of substitute for
commercial aviation.
Figure 3 Industry Structure in Porter's Five Forces Framework
1. Rivalry and Buyer Power
The duopoly between Airbus and Boeing is in intense competition. Beyond
general business economics, other factors are also part of the equation, such as national
pride and job security. The intense competition drives down prices, making both
companies more vulnerable during negotiations with airlines. The over-capacity in the
industry also gives the airlines a lot of bargaining power to play the two rival companies
off against each other. After September 11, owing to the difficult financial situation in the
25 Saloner, Shepard and Podolny. "Strategic Management", 2001. pg. 124-127.
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airline industry, businesses are scarce, which further contributes to the intense
competition.
2. Barriers-to-Entry
While there is generally high barrier of entry, the barriers are not prohibitively
high for companies who are already in "adjacent businesses". For example, Embraer, the
Brazil based company which used to build only corporate jets, managed to produce
commercial jets with more than 100 seats, putting themselves in direct competition with
the 737 and the A320. Their entrance of the E170/E190 into the market has been
extremely successful, as evident from their backlog orders worth USD 10.1 billion in
2004.26 Therefore, while the high costs of starting an aircraft-making business from
scratch might create high barriers of entry in general, companies in adjacent businesses
do not face such high barriers due to their existing infrastructure.
3. Supplier Power
Supplier power varies with the component or material supplied. For instance,
suppliers who sell highly sophisticated and expensive components, such as, avionics and
flight deck controls, tend to command more power than other suppliers. Moreover,
suppliers who provide scarce and critical materials, such as, aluminum, also possess more
power than other suppliers.
4. Substitutes
There is no currently known mode of transportation that offers an efficient
substitution for aviation. Other current modes of transportation do not offer the same
benefits, such as accessibility and travel time, as commercial aviation. There are a few
markets in which some substitution possibilities have emerged. For example,
26 http://www.embraer.com
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immediately after the September 11 incident, many passengers opted to travel between
various cities in the Northeast US corridor by rail.
Positioning for the Future
1. Boeing: the 787 program
In late 2002, Boeing Commercial Airplanes' Chief Executive Officer, Alan
Mullaly announced the cancellation of the Sonic Cruiser program. Instead, he redirected
the company's focus to developing the 7E7 (later renamed 787), which is designed to
capture the potential in the so called "middle of the market".
The "middle of the market" is the segment in which existing airplanes such as the
757, 767, A300/A3 10 and A330 currently serve. These models can fly approximately
3,000 to 6,500 nautical miles and carry passenger loads of approximately 180 to 250
people in both single- and twin-aisle configurations. The ideal airplane to best serve the
"middle of the market" should be able to operate equally efficiently for distances shorter
than 3,000 nautical miles or more than 7,800 nautical miles. If an airplane can fly
distances equivalent to a 777, carry a 767-level passenger load, and get passengers to
their destinations quicker, it will allow airlines to offer new nonstop services to more
destinations - profitably. 27
The motivation for the 787 is to offer the ideal airplane for the middle market. It
is designed to offer a 20% increase in fuel efficiency, an additional 60% in cargo
capacity, a technology enabled aircraft interior, and most importantly, lower overall
operating costs for the airlines. Figure 4 illustrates the middle market segment among
other aircraft segments.
27 "Finding the "Sweet Spot" in the Market - Maximizing the Middle", Boeing Frontiers, Mar 2003, pg. 14.
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Figure 4 What is the Middle of the Market (MOM)? 8
2. Airbus: The A380 and A350
The long-haul, jumbo jet market has long been dominated by Boeing's legendary
747. In 2000, Airbus launched the first double deck commercial jet - A380, which
completes the Airbus airplane family to serve all markets covering all nautical mile
range. Figure 529 provides an overview of the Airbus airplane family.
28 "Finding the "Sweet Spot" in the Market - Maximizing the Middle", Boeing Frontiers, Mar 2003, pg. 14.
29 http://www.airbus.com
24
Figure 5 Overview of the Airbus family30
The first A380 will enter service in 2006. It will seat 555 passengers in a typical
three-class interior layout. With increased capacity, Airbus estimates that the A380 has
the potential to increase an operator's return by as much as 35%, resulting in 15-20%
lower operating costs than any competitor aircraft. 31 The A380 will provide passengers
with luxury options never enjoyed aboard a commercial airliner. Airbus envisions that
airlines will use the ample space aboard the long-haul plane for cocktail lounges,
waterfall fountains and private suites that serve as in-air bedrooms and business meeting
areas. Airbus believes that the A380 is the right-sized airliner in light of the increasingly
congested skies and crowded international hubs. Airbus hopes to sell more than half of its
super-jumbos to airlines in developing nations in Asia, where a growing middle class
does not fly very much now but has become wealthy enough to do so. 32
30 http://www.airbus.com
31 http://www.airbus.coM/product/a380 economics.asp
32 "Hopes Big Plane Will Take Off; Behemoth Designed to End Reign of Rival Boeing's 747", The
Washington Post, Dec 10, 2004.
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At the end of 2004, Airbus planned to roll out the A350, a derivative of the
current A330. It is designed to compete head to head with Boeing's 787 in the medium-
to-long range market. A350 will have the same cockpit and similar on-board systems to
its existing A330 jet but will weigh 8.8 US tons less, thus allowing for heavier engines.
The new engines, to be supplied initially by General Electric Co., will benefit from
technologies developed for the 787." Airbus predicts that the operating cost of A350 will
be 6-7% lower than that of the 787 and can enter service in 2010 in two configurations.
3. The Future of Air Travel
There is ample literature, from academic journals to general business publications,
which forecast the dynamics of the future of air travel. The development of the 787 is an
indication that Boeing believes the future of air travel will be primarily based on
frequent, point-to-point travel between most destinations. On the other hand, Airbus
develops the A380 based on the belief that the crowded air space will put pressure on
frequent schedules, and the future of flying will primarily be a hub-and-spoke system.
Understandably, airlines have little incentive to put either aircraft manufacturer
out of business. Fierce competition between Airbus and Boeing affords the airlines
enormous power in fleet purchase negotiations. Therefore, most airlines would prefer to
maintain a mixed fleet of aircrafts from each manufacturer. For example, as of 2005,
Cathay Pacific's current fleet consists of 4lplanes from Airbus (18 of A340 and 23 of
A330) and 34 planes from Boeing (19 of 747 and 15 of 777)34. The A330 and A340 are
used primarily for shorter flights while 777 and 747 are used for longer, trans-Pacific
flights. Therefore, with both manufacturers now offering aircrafts that service all markets,
3 "Airbus Gets Green Light to Launch 7E7 Challenger", Associate Press Worldstream, Financial News,
Dec 10, 2004.
3 http://www.cathaypacific.com/intl/inflight/fleet/O..,00.html
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airlines can choose planes from different manufacturers for different routes. For example,
Airbus'A380 would be an attractive candidate for a few major trans-Pacific routes that
generally have high load factors but less frequent schedules. Meanwhile, Boeing's 787
would be the ideal aircraft to fly trans-Atlantic routes on more frequent schedules.
On the other hand, there are also cost benefits of maintaining a single aircraft
fleet, as evident by the success of Southwest, which keeps maintenance cost low with its
entire fleet of Boeing 737. In fact, this approach is practiced by many low cost carriers.
However, such a strategy would only apply to low cost carriers, which typically offer a
limited set of routes. Traditional airlines, which serve many worldwide destinations,
cannot maintain a single aircraft fleet, which is too restrictive in terms of range and
passenger load.
As a result, most airlines will buy different models from both manufacturers to
serve different routes. Moreover, now that both manufacturers offer products that service
all market segments, competition will intensify and further drive down prices. In such
competitive dynamics, the manufacturers can only get ahead if they focus on reducing
cost to improve their bottom-line. If they have a cost advantage over their rival, they will
be able to offer competitive prices and still maintain a healthy margin. Therefore, in the
future, sustainable competitive advantages will not only come from superior design and
engineering of the aircraft, but also from more cost-effective manufacturing and supply
chain management. The next section will provide a closer look at how both
manufacturers can leverage cost-cutting opportunities in their supply chain to obtain a
sustainable competitive advantage.
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II. Supply Chain Analysis
A. Literature Review
Supply chain issues in the aerospace industry have been extensively studied in
many academic and business publications. In academic circles, the aerospace industry is
often used as a research example to illustrate how an industry with slow clockspeed and
heavy inertia respond to new supply chain practices. For example, in an article on recent
supply chain reforms for many manufacturers3 5 , Anselmo suggested that many
executives and consultants consider the aerospace supply chain years behind other
industries such as automobiles, consumer electronics and construction. He attributed this
trend to the industry's lagging adoption of information technology, which creates
challenges for the members of supply chain to share information and work closely with
one another.
Fine, in his book "Clockspeed" 36, discussed extensively Boeing's decision to
outsource many of its work to its suppliers, in particular, wing manufacturing to Japanese
manufacturers. Using the double helix framework introduced in his book, Fine concluded
that while outsourcing is a natural outcome for the aircraft industry, Boeing also needs to
consider the long term impact that the outsource decision has on the company's core
capability. Fine also used the Boeing 777 as a prominent example to illustrate the
importance of concurrent engineering in products with integral product architecture. He
suggested that the best place is to be is on the diagonal - modular product architecture be
3 Anselmo, Joseph. "Supply Chain Reforms Too Late for Many Manufacturers", Aviation Week and Space
Technology, Nov 14, 2004.
36 Fine, Charles. Clockspeed, 1998.
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supported by a modular supply chain design, and integral product architecture supported
by an integral supply chain design (see section B).
This thesis will draw extensively on Fine's work and further discuss many of
these supply chain challenges in greater depths and how they manifest themselves in
execution. In particular, specific examples will be drawn from Boeing 787 new aircraft
development in chapter III.
B. Supply Chain Dynamics
* Value Chain Overview
Equipment Component Subsystem Aircraft* Financing Airlines Flying Public
/ Cargo
* Includes design, engineering, manufacturing and assembly
Figure 6 Value Chain for Civil Aviation
Figure 6 shows the major components in the entire value chain for civil aviation.
Traditionally, aircraft manufacturers perform most of the design, engineering,
manufacturing and assembly of the aircraft. For instance, even today, Boeing
manufactures and assembles the wing for some sustaining programs. The manufacturers
only outsource some critical subsystems beyond their core competence, such as avionics
and software. However, as the world of business becomes increasingly global and
organizations become increasingly complex, many companies seek outsourcing options,
so as to focus on their core competence while leverage outsourcing to reduce costs. In
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fact, the current operating model at Airbus is heavily decentralized and modularized. I
will discuss this in further details in a later part of this section.
* Make vs. Buy
While it is widely believed that most companies should keep in-house their core
competence and outsource non-core activities, one needs to be aware of the dependency
dynamics. When an organization makes a sourcing decision, whether internal or
external, it is planting a "capability seed" that has the potential to grow into a valuable
and powerful organizational competency.38 For instance, by outsourcing to Japanese
aerospace suppliers, Boeing planted the seeds of various competencies that grew under
their own power over time, and eventually went beyond the ability of Boeing to control
them. As Boeing no longer manufactures their wings, it might lose their knowledge and
know-how in the long term. Meanwhile, Japanese aerospace suppliers will develop so
much expertise that their proficiency in wing design and manufacturing will take on a life
of its own, turning the table around and allowing them to gain much more power in its
relationship with Boeing. As illustrated in Figure 7, Boeing's subcontracts had a positive
impact on the size and technological capabilities of the Japanese suppliers, which, in turn,
increased Japanese industry autonomy and ultimately the ability of that industry to
demand more critical work, enabling them to win more contracts.39
3 Fine, Charles. Clockspeed, 1998. pg. 159-160.
38 Fine, Charles. Clockspeed, 1998, pg. 159.
9 Fine, Charles. Clockspeed, 1998, pg. 162-163.
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Figure 7 Boeing's Dependency Dynamics Capability Outsourcing and Technological Dependency
Depending on the actual component and function that is outsourced, the
dependency would have a different impact. For instance, outsourcing component
fabrication would have a lesser dependency effect than outsourcing airframe design and
assembly on which the overall system performance highly depends.
One would argue whether companies can engage in outsourcing and yet maintain
its technical expertise and know-how in the product, thereby breaking the dependency
dynamics cycle. In fact, many companies try to keep their expertise in-house by
duplicating work and establishing additional levels of oversight processes inside the
company to ensure keeping the know-how in-house. Such strategies add additional layers
of reporting and supervision structure, which are unnecessary for execution and
inevitably increase project costs. Therefore, the additional cost increase might outweigh
the cost benefits from engaging in outsourcing in the first place.
31
Jap
T d
4A
9 Integration vs. Disintegration
As shown in figure 8, the dependency dynamics provides some insights on the
evolution of the supply chain. The "double helix" is a framework which outlines how
industry structure and product structure evolves from integral to modular and back.4 0 It
explains why firms would engage in a constant cycle of integration and disintegration,
and of moving processes in and out of the company. The speed at which the company
engages in this cycle heavily depends on the clockspeed at which the industry operates.
For example, the automotive industry went through the double helix two to three times
when the aerospace industry went through it once.
Using this framework, we can make some predictions on how the industry will
evolve. Currently, as evident by the increasing amount of outsourcing activities, the
aircraft manufacturing industry experiences pressure to disintegrate and modularize the
supply chain. As a result, component manufacturers with faster clockspeed, such as
control software and system electronics providers, stand to benefit significantly from
modularization, since it enables much easier and quicker product upgrades without
significant impact on overall integration.
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40 Fine, Charles. Clockspeed, 1998.
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Figure 8 The Double Helix - Illustrating How Industry/Product Structure Evolve from
Vertical/Integral to Horizontal/Modular, and Back.
* Airbus' Modularized Supply Chain
Leveraging its consortium structure, Airbus developed a well-run and highly
modularized supply chain. Since Airbus is essentially a consortium of companies with
each individual company or subsidiary needing to own its share of the responsibility in
the airplane production process, Airbus modularized their plane design so that each
company can conveniently own a piece of the work, with all the pieces then being
seamlessly integrated. Furthermore, Airbus developed a common platform on which all
planes in its airplane family operate. Based on this common platform, each company in
the consortium specializes on one set of components for the entire airplane family. Such
specialization allows individual companies to develop an expertise in their respective
components, and facilitates product innovation for new generations of airplanes.
Figure 9 illustrates the various factors enabling Airbus' modularized supply chain.
Due to stable long term relationships with its partners and suppliers, many of them being
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companies in the consortium, Airbus is free to allow these companies to build a high
level of expertise around their respective sets of components. With such high level of
product expertise at the partners and suppliers, as long as clear contractual and
collaboration terms are outlined, Airbus can be very hands-off in managing its suppliers
and comfortable giving its partners high level of accountability. In addition, since most of
these companies are located in Europe, their proximity greatly facilitates logistics
coordination. With this supply chain design, Airbus only needs to develop competency in
partnership management and large systems integration, in addition to design and
engineering.
High level of build
expertise reside at 4Commonality
partners, not Airbus across airplaneP families
Hands-off Long term
management relationships with
with partners partners and
suppliers across
airplane families
Clearly outlined Partner/Supply
contractual terms base is primarily
and proven High level of Europe-based
collaboration accountability
protocol with partners
Figure 9 Airbus' Modularized Supply Chain
* Alignment of Product and Supply Chain Architecture
However, should a product with highly integrated product architecture, such as
that of the modem commercial jet, be produced using a modularized supply chain? In his
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book Clockspeed1 , Fine argues that in essence, product and supply chain architectures
tend to be mutually reinforcing. Therefore, product and supply chain architectures should
be aligned; integral products should be developed by integral supply chains, and modular
products should be built by modular supply chains.
As illustrated in figure 10, even in the same industry, firms can produce vastly
different kinds of product and adopt different supply chain architectures, and be equally
successful, as long as their product and supply chain architecture are aligned. As an
example, consider the two automotive manufacturers, BMW and Chrysler. BMW
products are among the highest performing luxury sedans in the world. Therefore, BMW
sacrifices much in cost and development time in order to deliver the best possible
performance in a highly integrated product. Few other car companies in the world could
match BMW in performance, handling, and safety. Automotive critics regularly voted
BMW's models the best cars in the world in their respective class.4 2 Such integrality in
the product requires a highly integrated supply chain to ensure tight control of vehicle
specifications and smooth interactions among all key subsystems.
41 Fine, Charles. Clockspeed, 1998.
42 BMW: The 7-Series Project (A), Harvard Business School Case Studies, Jan 3, 2002.
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Figure 10 Interactions between Product and Supply Chain Architectures
On the other hand, Chrysler's strategy is to reduce the total time and cost required
to develop and launch a new vehicle by outsourcing the development and integration of
many automotive subsystems. Therefore, Chrysler focuses on designing cars that can be
modularized for its supply chain. Such design puts Chrysler's product, and supply chain
in alignment. By designing cars for a modularized supply chain with significant
outsourcing, Chrysler is able to produce a variety of cars that are less expensive, with
decent overall reliability and performance, at a price affordable for the mass market in a
relatively short period of time.
Therefore, it is possible for different companies in the same industry to choose to
produce products with different product and supply chain architectures, as long as the two
architectures are aligned with each other.
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III. Case Study: 787 Supply Chain Development
A. Introduction
0 The New Airplane - 787
The 787 (formerly named 7E7) is a brand new airplane development program in
the Boeing Company. Announced in 2002, the airplane is anticipated to be in service by
2008. Figure 11 outlines the key milestones of the program to date (as of July 2004).
Dec 2002 Alan Mulally, Boeing Commercial Airplanes president and CEO, announced that the
company will focus its commercial product development efforts on a new super-efficient
twinjet aimed at the middle of the market.
Jan 2003 A new senior leadership team was established for the 7E7 program.
June 2003 Composites were selected as the primary material for the 7E7 primary structure.
Nov 2003 Airlines representatives gathered in Seattle for updates on the 7E7 and are the first to tour
the new 7E7 interior mock up.
Nov 2003 Boeing announced its selections of structural partners.
Dec 2003 The Boeing board of directors granted authority to offer the 7E7 for sale, clearing the way
for the first formal sales offers.
Feb 2004 Boeing began to announce its systems partners for the 7E7.
April 2004 General Electric and Rolls-Royce were selected to provide engines for the program.
April 2004 Boeing launched the 7E7 with a record-breaking launch order for 50 airplanes from ANA
(All Nippon Airways).
Figure 11 Key Milestones in the 787 Program43
The new airplane offers an enhanced environmental performance (20% increase
in fuel efficiency), up to 60% more cargo capacity, a dramatically different interior and
improved customer flying experience (larger windows, wider seats and aisles, innovative
lighting, better-controlled cabin pressure and humidity, and reduced noise level), and
overall lower operating cost. In addition to product features, the 787 is also very different
from the sustaining programs (other Boeing 7-series airplane program) in many different
43 "Tomorrow in the Works", Boeing Frontiers, Jul 2004, pg. 14.
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ways. Figure 12 outlines some of the key differences between the sustaining programs
and the 787 program.
Existing Airplane Programs 787 Program
Thousands of options available per airplane Hundreds of options available per airplane
Boeing manages hundreds of suppliers at all levels Boeing deals with much fewer partners
Boeing defines end item configuration (except Partners or associate partners define end item
engines). Suppliers builds end item per "Build-to- configuration (except engines). Partners defines and
Print" model builds end item (not "Build-to-Print")
Boeing manages the build configuration during the Boeing manages overall large scale systems
entire build cycle integration
Thousands of end items in final assembly Much fewer end items in final assembly
Figure 12 Anticipated Differences between 787 and sustaining programs
The design of the new airplane is in line with the company's overall strategy,
which is to move up the value chain, to become a large-scale system integrator and to
become a global company. For example, reducing the number of parts and leveraging its
supplier network allows Boeing to move up the value chain more effectively, and to
focus on large-scale system integration instead of manufacturing and fabrication. In
addition, Boeing also hopes to develop expertise in large-scale system integration by
focusing on managing the final assembly. Reducing product options allows easier product
modularization and standardization, enabling Boeing to better leverage the suppliers' and
partners' network.
The Challenge of the New Partnership Structure
In addition to having different product features, the 787 program is also the first
program in which many new business processes and systems are put in place. The most
fundamental - and the biggest - challenge is to execute the new partnership structure.
Boeing has traditionally worked with a lot of suppliers who manufacture and design their
subsystems and components. Therefore, the suppliers are not new to working with
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Boeing. However, Boeing is revolutionizing its way of doing business with their
suppliers in the 787 program. Instead of the old "supplier-Boeing" relationship, Boeing
aspires to engage them as partners - who are working, learning, sharing risks, and
succeeding together. Essentially, the partnership ties Boeing and their partners' fate as
one. This is a brand new concept, both to Boeing and to their suppliers. In the past, while
they work very closely together, their relationship is still positioned at an arm's length.
Since Boeing is at the downstream in the value chain and ultimately it's a "Boeing
plane", the company underwrites the product and "absorbs" all the shocks in the process.
However, under the new partnership structure, their fates are tied.
In fact, the partnership concept is nothing extraordinarily groundbreaking. In
other industries, such as automotive and computer manufacturing, similar partnerships
have existed for decades. However, implementing such structure for a legendary
aerospace company like Boeing is a revolution like no other. In fact, interestingly
enough, the partnership structure does not only apply between Boeing and its partners,
but also, within the Boeing Company. In current airplane programs, the company is
organized into many functional divisions which operate like many distinctive units.
However, Boeing is implementing a new organizational design to the 787 program.
Instead of operating with functional units, the 787 program will be primarily driven by
design-build teams.
In fact, Airbus has practiced a partnership structure for decades. For Airbus,
establishing a partnership structure is a natural evolution. Since Airbus is essentially a
structured consortium with many independently run subsidiary units, these subsidiary
units essentially form a partnership structure. Therefore, for many years, Airbus has
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designed their aircraft for standardization and modularization enabling a strong
partnership network.
The Supply Chain Challenge
Majority of Parts
Suppliers Few Other Majority of Facilities
~~ Components - Suppliers Parts
------------- Contractual & Financial
Agreements
Figure 13 Supply Chain for the Sustaining Programs
Figure 13 shows a high level overview of current supply chain design for the
sustaining programs. Most of the parts which Boeing directly contracts are delivered to
Boeing facilities. There will be very few components which Boeing contracts to be drop-
shipped to other suppliers' facilities.
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Components
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Majority of
Parts
Partners Structural Fuselage Final Assembly
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Figure 14 787 Supply Chain Design
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However, as shown in Figure 14, in the 787 supply chain design, the majority of
parts contracted directly by Boeing will be delivered to non-Boeing facilities. Under the
new arrangement, Boeing establishes partnership agreements with a few key structural
partners. The structural partners are responsible for designing and manufacturing their
respective "stuffed sections" of the 787. "Stuffed sections" are essentially a section of the
airplane with the structural elements (e.g. floors, beams), and electronic components (e.g.
wires, sensors, systems) and sometimes even interiors (e.g. walls, carpets) fully installed.
The few "stuffed sections" will then be connected and integrated during fuselage
integration or final assembly. As an illustration, Figure 15 shows a picture of a stuffed
section of a ship in the ship building industry.
Figure 15 Stuffed Section of a Ship4
At a high level, Airbus' supply chain resembles that of the 787 program.
However, instead of contracting the major of components directly with component
suppliers, Airbus subsidiaries would instead set up those contracts themselves. This is
44 Photo courtesy of Professor Daniel Whitney.
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easier for Airbus since the subsidiaries are responsible for the same sections across all
planes in the family, and they can leverage the commonality across all planes to set up
long term contracts with their suppliers.
The new supply chain design poses some new challenges for Boeing. Two main
issues are the coordination of ordering and scheduling, and quality management.
Furthermore, since components will be shipped to structural partners all over the world
for installation into the stuffed section, questions about whether or not such a build plan
makes sense for all systems components arise. For example, inefficient situations may
arise in which a systems component is shipped from the US to Europe for the often-trivial
installation at the structural partners, and then the stuffed section is shipped back to the
US for final assembly. It may have been more efficient to ship the systems component
directly to the final assembly site in Everett, Washington, and to perform the simple
installation there. However, one would have to consider whether such a scheme will
affect the targeted 3-day production cycle at the final assembly site.
* Key Research Questions
The crux of the new supply chain design lies in Boeing's relationship with its
suppliers, and in particular, how Boeing defines roles and responsibilities for its partners
and suppliers. Such consideration needs to be put in place during the contract drafting
and negotiation stage. I was privileged to have the opportunity to participate in the 787
program at this critical time when a lot of these contract terms are to be finalized. After
spending time learning about the program and collecting data within and outside the
company, I discovered that the impact on operation costs from the drop-shipped
components is one of the most important challenges of the 787 program. Currently, since
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drop-shipped components account for only a small portion of total components, any
inefficiency in managing these parts can be tolerated without causing a detrimental effect
to the overall operation cost. However, as the 787 program moves towards drop-shipping
the majority of its components, any inefficiency in the current management system will
become prominent and its cost impact will be amplified. Therefore, it is very important
for the 787 program to anticipate these problems and put in place the necessary systems
during the product and process development phase, in order to enable smooth
implementation when production starts.
In order to put in place a set of processes that will be sustainable for the
anticipated high volume of drop-ship components, the 787 program will need to address
the following questions:
o How can the current ordering, scheduling, delivery and payment trigger
processes be adopted for the 787 program? What needs to be changed?
How can Boeing adopt a less hands-on approach with its partners and yet
maintain adequate visibility into the production and delivery of the
components? What are the organizational barriers that need to be
overcome in implementing the new processes?
o How can the current quality control and non-conformance management
mechanisms be adopted for the 787 program? What needs to be changed?
How can Boeing ensure adequate quality control and efficiently manage
non-conformance in the new supply chain design? Where will there be
resistance in the organization and how can they be overcome?
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B. Ordering and Scheduling
* The Challenge
In the sustaining programs, some materials and components that Boeing directly
purchases are drop-shipped from component suppliers to structural partners for
installation or further work. Compared to components that are procured by and directly
delivered to Boeing facilities, these components go through a different procurement
process. Figure 16 outlines the major steps in the current drop-shipped materials process.
6. Perform quarterly audit
5. Send shipping notice at time
of shipment
1. Establish
contract & issue
purchase order
.~i~LK~ &~. x~w'EM
5. Ship parts
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Boeing with
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from multiple
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4. Call to schedule
delivery dates and
manage inventory and
order discrepancies
Figure 16 Drop-Shipped Components Management Process
First, Boeing sets up purchase order and long term purchase contracts with the
component suppliers, as well as agreements with the structural partners. Boeing's
supplier management department then merges schedules from various suppliers and
partners and decides on shipping quantity and schedule based on the overall airplane
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build and production plan. The supplier management department will then contact both
the component supplier and structural partner for shipment and receipt. While the
components are shipped from the component supplier, a shipping notice will be sent to
Boeing. When the structural partner receives the shipment, a receipt notice will also be
sent to Boeing. Every quarter, representatives from the supplier management department
in Boeing will visit both suppliers and partners and perform an audit to manage
discrepancy in inventory level.
Having the visibility into the procurement and shipping processes is very
important for Boeing. It allows Boeing to track down and follow up with any orders, as
well as handle quality, payment and delivery issues in the pipeline. However, the current
process of merging schedules and requests from multiple component suppliers and
structural partners as well as managing inventory discrepancies between suppliers involve
primarily manual labor in the supplier management department. This is understandable,
as the current system was designed and tailored for the sustaining programs. In sustaining
programs, only a small number of components go through this procurement process,
since most of the parts are directly shipped to Boeing facilities for assembly and the
current resources in the supplier management department is sufficient to handle the load.
However, for the 787 program, there needs to be a paradigm shift, as the
structural partners are now responsible for assembling the entire stuffed sections. As
described above, many components, systems components in particular, need to be
shipped to the structural partners for installation into the stuffed sections. Therefore, the
load of components going through this process increases significantly. Unfortunately, the
current process has limited capacity and is not designed to be very scalable. Therefore,
45
additional resources and changes are required to devise a procurement process that will
work for the 787 program.
* Competitive Benchmarking
Since every subsidiary in the Airbus consortium operates like an independent
company, each of them performs its own supplier management and procurement
functions.45 Therefore, unlike Boeing, very few components will be procured by a central
authority to be drop-shipped to another location. Instead, each company will procure its
necessary components to be used on its own facility. Therefore, the procurement
transaction is very clear and simple. While Airbus might negotiate bulk-buy purchasing
contracts for its subsidiaries, the transactional responsibilities reside with individual
companies. Thus, the buyer company first establishes a purchase order with and provides
a delivery schedule to a component supplier, and notifies the supplier when the parts is
needed. Since only two parties (buyer company and component supplier) are involved,
accountability and responsibilities are well aligned and easily traceable.
* The Recommendation
One key question to ask is what role should Boeing play in the ordering and
scheduling process. In the spirit of the partnership structure for the 787, Boeing's role
should evolve from that of an underwriter to that of a facilitator. For instance, in the event
of discrepancies in the ordering and scheduling processes, Boeing should not take full
responsibility and accountability. The current approach is a drain to the company's
resources and most importantly, out of line with the spirit of the partnership structure.
4 Data from Benchmarking Group, The Boeing Company.
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On the other hand, Boeing wishes to continue to play a role in managing the
interactions between partners and suppliers because it still owns the final design and
integration of the aircraft upon delivery. Boeing can conceivably achieve this purpose by
setting up and maintaining a virtual interface - a supplier portal - for communication
between Boeing, partners and suppliers. Boeing provides and maintains the interface,
while the partners and suppliers provide the content. Figure 17 illustrated how the
supplier portal could facilitate communication between the partners and suppliers.
5. Obtain
master
schedule and
production
schedule
4. Provide
production
schedule
6. Deliver Darts
5. Activate
delivery
1. Issues
purchase order
2. Submit
master
schedule
3. Obtain
master
schedule
8. Send receipt
notification
7. Send shipping
notification
Figure 17 How a Supplier Portal Facilitate Communication between Boeing, Structural Partners and
Component Suppliers
In the newly designed scheme, Boeing establishes a purchase order with
individual partners and suppliers and submits master production schedule to the supplier
portal. The master production schedule is the final assembly schedule. Structural partners
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9. Initiate
payment
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then obtain the master production schedule from the supplier portal and use it to draft
their own production and component requirement schedule, which will also be submitted
to the portal. Component suppliers can now go to the supplier portal and obtain the latest
production and component requirement schedule from the structural partners, whom they
need to supply to, and the master production schedule managed by Boeing. By
integrating all these schedules, component suppliers can use the information to forecast
their own production and inventory levels. When parts are needed, structural partners
send out requests to activate delivery at the component suppliers. Upon delivery and
receipt of components, component suppliers and structural partners will both send out
notification to Boeing to initiate payment. Figure 18 outlines the roles and responsibilities
using the supplier portal.
Structural Partners
* Obtain Boeing master schedule from supplier portal and formulate own production schedule
with need-dates for components
* Provide production schedule on supplier portal
* Activate delivery to systems partners
Component Supplier / Partner Boeing
* Obtain purchase order from Boeing * Issues purchase order
* Obtain the master schedule submitted by * Submits master schedule to supplier
Boeing and the production schedules portal
submitted by the structural partners * Initiates payment upon receipt of
* Respond to delivery activation from structural shipment notification
partners
* Deliver components to structural partners
* Send shipping notification to Boeing upon
shipment I
Figure 18 Roles and Responsibilities in Ordering and Scheduling
The newly designed scheme clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of
Boeing, its partners and suppliers. It removes Boeing's participation from the day-to-day
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ordering and scheduling activities, which should be performed by partners and suppliers
since they are more intimately tied to the production and usage of the components. On the
other hand, it offers Boeing the visibility into the entire supply chain, which allows the
company to devise risk mitigation activities when things do not go as planned. For
example, Boeing can obtain knowledge about a missing component early in the
production process, and can decide whether there is a need to adjust the final assembly
schedule accordingly.
In addition, this new design will streamline the overall ordering and scheduling
process, eliminate mundane work from the supplier management department and allow
the procurement agents to focus on other higher value-added activities, e.g. management
and maintenance of the supplier portal to facilitate communication with the suppliers.
* The Implementation
1. Resource Requirements
The redesign would be best led and coordinated by the supplier management
department. Its execution requires a cross-functional project team with representatives
from many different parts of the 787 program, as well as the partners and suppliers.
2. Risks
Data integrity is the biggest risk of this redesign. Since partners and suppliers
interact with the portal directly, Boeing cannot ensure the quality of data that are
published on the portal. Therefore, issues with data integrity and their impact on
production and component delivery will be pushed up the value chain and will eventually
affect final assembly schedule and final product delivery. Since Boeing is responsible for
the final product delivery, it is absorbing a large amount of the shock and cost from
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having low data integrity on the supplier portal. Therefore, in order to mitigate such risks,
Boeing needs to clearly communicate upfront to the partners and suppliers regarding the
roles and responsibilities when using the supplier portal and align incentives with the
suppliers accordingly.
3. Organizational Challenges
Setting up the technical solution for the supplier portal is relatively easy, yet
encouraging the 787 program, both Boeing and its partners, to efficiently leverage the
portal and integrate it into their day-to-day work is very difficult. First of all, all suppliers
are very used to working with the supplier management department at Boeing to and
from whom they provide and obtain their build and delivery schedules. Under the new
system, the supplier would need to communicate with the supplier portal instead. There
might be resistance coming from the suppliers since they will now be solely responsible
for the integrity of the data, whereas in the past, there is more shared accountability with
Boeing. Therefore, it is very important for Boeing to clearly define and communicate the
expectations and accountability of data with the suppliers upfront.
C. Quality and Compliance
* The Challenge
Boeing currently has a compliance program which manages quality for drop-
shipped components. Figure 19 highlights quality compliance management process.
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Figure 19 Quality Compliance Management Process
There are many different types of quality compliance issues. Some quality
problems are discovered upon receipt in which case the structural partner will
immediately send a notification to both the component supplier and Boeing. However,
most of the issues are not discovered until the parts are actually being put in installation
or into further work. When the systems do not function as they should after all the
components are put together, troubleshooting is usually done. As per the regulations, all
these parts have to be sent back to the suppliers for re-certification, despite that many of
these pulled-out parts are perfectly functional. In fact, the component suppliers typically
report "no fault found" in nearly all returned parts. In addition, since the structural
partners do not own all these "pulled out parts," they have little incentive to return them
for re-certification in a timely manner. Consequently, since Boeing owns these parts, the
payment to suppliers is triggered once the parts leave the component supplier's dock in
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the original shipment. Another consequence is that structural partners often need to order
more than what the original production schedule requires in order to account for the
"pulled out parts," usually two to three times of the original order.
When there is a confusion regarding liability and accountability, Boeing will send
out representatives to the suppliers and the partners to understand the cause of the non-
conformance and decide on next steps (use, repair, discard), as well as track
accountability and bill the suppliers accordingly. At times when accountability is unclear
and difficult to trace, Boeing will become ultimately accountable since it owns the final
product.
Like the ordering and scheduling process, the quality compliance management
process is currently a model sufficient for the sustaining programs, but not for the 787
program when many of the components have to go through the drop-ship procedure.
0 Competitive Benchmarking
Airbus has a very different culture in managing quality compliance from that of
Boeing46. They are much more hands-off with their suppliers since they have a history of
enforcing the strict quality measurements listed on their contracts with the suppliers. In
fact, their consortium structure enables such hand-offs management since the majority of
knowledge and expertise resides at the suppliers. Therefore, their suppliers tend to be
more independent and less reliant on directions from Airbus.
46 Based on anecdotal data from conversations with industry experts.
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0 The Recommendation
One of the issues with the current quality management program is the difficulty
and the long lag time in tracing accountability when there is a compliance issue.
Currently, the program relies on Boeing's procurement agents traveling to the partner and
supplier sites to locate the issues and report back to central procurement before deciding
on next steps. This process is difficult to manage and requires a lot of resource support
from the procurement group. Most importantly, there is a significant lag time (can be as
high as three months) between the occurrence and the investigation of the non-
conformance issue. If this process were to be implemented for the 787 program, Boeing
would need to increase its resource support from its procurement department
substantially since the majority of the components would be drop-shipped to non-Boeing
facilities under the new program.
After studying the production and procurement systems at Toyota and
Volkswagen4 7 , I discovered that both systems have one thing in common - that non-
conformance is 100% managed at the drop-ship location (structural partners). For
example, Toyota suppliers are required to be on site (at Toyota facilities or other partner
facilities, depending on where installation takes place) to supervise installation, and the
component is not considered "transferred to Toyota books" until the installation of the
component has passed quality check. The supplier representative is also on site to answer
questions and resolve compliance dispute. Therefore, all decisions can be made on the
spot without going back and forth with procurement staff at the headquarters. Figure 20
4 7 Data from Benchmarking Group, The Boeing Company.
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illustrates how we could learn from this practice to modify the current non-conformance
process for 787.
2. Non-
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sit e rep site rep
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feedback for -- shipped 3. Root cause improvement
continuous and next steps
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Figure 20 Applying Best Practice from Automotive Industry to Current Quality Compliance
Management Process
Since most of the drop-shipped components will be installed at the structural
partners' sites, it is important to have representatives from both the component suppliers
and Boeing to be present there. These on-site representatives will be able to provide
guidance for installation, identify the root cause of non-conformance, as well as resolve
any dispute on the spot. They can also communicate quality issues back to their
respective headquarters for continuous improvement. Since Boeing owns the component
at installation, it is important for the Boeing on-site representative to have the authority to
decide on the action (repair, replace or use-as-is) regarding the component in question.
Currently, such decision authority resides in the procurement headquarters. Therefore,
handling of any non-conformance issue requires communication with the headquarters,
before any decision on the component can be made, resulting in significant lag time
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between the occurrence and the resolution in the event of a dispute. On the contrary,
under the new system, the Boeing on-site representative possesses authority to make such
decision on the spot, enabling quick resolution of conflict as well as prompt action on the
component in question.
While this redesign would incur additional cost, the benefits from reduction in
non-conformance costs are substantial. Its impact can be calculated by the evaluating the
cost of handling all the returned parts that are found to be no-fault, the cost of re-
qualifying the parts, as well as the cost of capital for Boeing while these parts are in the
compliance process.
The Implementation
1. Resource Requirements
While this new design would bring in substantial benefits, there are a lot of costs
associated with it, namely the costs of placing company representatives at the suppliers'
sites. While these representatives are very important in the early stage of the product
lifecycle when the production processes have not yet stabilized, their roles diminish as
the production processes mature. Therefore, they can be redeployed to other roles to
reduce costs.
2. Risks
The new process heavily relies on the company representatives in managing these
supplier relationships. Since both technical knowledge and relationships reside with the
on-site representatives, Boeing risks losing these valuable assets if there is turnover.
Therefore, it might not be in Boeing's best interests to become dependent on its on-site
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representatives in managing its supplier relationships. Such risks need to be taken into
account when deciding on implementing the redesign.
D. Final Thoughts
Unlike the sustaining programs, the 787 program is designed to instill close
collaboration between Boeing and its partners. If the 787 program succeeds, Boeing may
consider applying this collaboration model to other airplane programs. Although the
concept itself is sound and offers lots of tangible benefits, one may question whether the
partnership model is appropriate for the company's conservative culture. Traditionally,
employees are often encouraged to engage in activities to "make-sure" and "double-
check." The many current systems and processes are designed to enable that. This culture
means that when working with partners, Boeing people tend to get very closely involved
with all suppliers on all processes. People consider it necessary to understand everything
that goes into the airplane in order to make sure nothing goes wrong, because Boeing is
ultimately accountable for the final product. Indeed, many argue that such conservatism
is appropriate for an aircraft manufacturer, as the quality of the product must be ensured
at all cost."A8
The new supply chain model relies heavily on trust between Boeing and the
partners. If Boeing ends up managing the suppliers' business, it will not be able to reap
the benefits from the collaboration. On the other hand, instead of being the passive
players they were in the past, partners also need to take a more active role in managing
this collaboration. Indeed, both Boeing and the partners will need to move out of their
48 Anselmo, Joseph. "Supply Chain Reforms Too Late for Many Manufacturers,". Aviation Week and
Space Technology, Nov 14,2004.
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current paradigms. As I reflect on this issue, I recall that Professor Jonathan Byrnes once
said in his class - Case Studies in Supply Chain Management, "The hard part is the
easiest part; the soft part is the hardest part." What I found is that developing the
recommendations is not complicated, but enabling the organization to achieve them is
what is truly daunting.
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IV. Concluding Remarks
The 787 program offers an exciting opportunity for the Boeing Company. Not
only does it represent a new market opportunity, but it also provides a platform on which
the company can implement many new business processes, including a new partnership
and supply chain structure. This new collaboration model, if executed successfully, could
conceivably turn the company around and the 787 program could become a pilot program
for other sustaining airplane programs.
However, as discussed in this thesis, implementing new supply chain processes is
not without challenges. Many of these challenges are tactical, and can be resolved by
better technologies and coordination. Yet, enabling them across the organization requires
much more than tactical solutions. It requires a fundamental change in thinking on the
way how business is conducted and a paradigm shift in the definition of relationships
between Boeing and its partners. More importantly, such changes cannot only happen at
the senior management level, but rather, at all levels in the organization. It is of
paramount importance for Boeing employees at all levels to recognize this need for a
paradigm shift, in order to drive the 787 program home.
"Paradigmatic change is very important in business. It has the potential to create
major new value and to renew a company, but its is very difficult to accomplish in
the absence of a business crisis" - Jonathan Byrnes49
49 "The Challenges of Paradigmatic Change," Jonathan Byrnes. Harvard Business Review - Working
Knoweldge, Oct 4,2004.
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